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Notes
The Constitutionality of the Freedom of




On March 24, 1993, the Senate Committee on Labor and Human
Resources ordered the Freedom of Choice Act of 19931 (FOCA) fa-
vorably reported to the Senate.2 The purpose of this bill is to codify
* J.D. Candidate, 1994; B.S. 1991, University of California, Los Angeles.
1. S. 25, 103d Cong., 1st. Sess. (1993) [hereinafter FOCA]. For the complete text of
FOCA, see Appendix following this Note infra.
2. 139 CONG. REc. D279 (daily ed. Mar. 24,1993). The bill was originally introduced
in 1989 as S. 1912, the Freedom of Choice Act of 1989. S. REP. No. 42, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. 3 (1993). It was re-introduced as S. 25 on January 14, 1991, but Senate Majority
Leader George Mitchell, D-Me., expressed "serious reservations" about its constitutional-
ity. Talking Points, WASH. PosT, Feb. 4, 1992, at A13. Mitchell, a former United States
District Court judge, raised questions about "whether 'fundamental constitutional rights'
should be established by a majority vote in Congress," and called proposed congressional
action on FOCA "'a very dangerous precedent' that would allow another Congress to re-
peal that right by simple majority." Id. (quoting Mitchell). The Senate Subcommittee on
Labor and Human Resources held further hearings on May 13, 1992 to address these con-
cerns. Freedom of Choice Act of 1991: Hearing on S. 25 Before the Senate Comm. on
Labor and Human Resources, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) [hereinafter Constitutionality
Hearings]. These hearings led to the current version of the bill, which was introduced on
July 15, 1992, then re-introduced in the 103d Congress on January 21, 1993. 139 CONG.
REc. S190 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1993). The Senate Subcommittee on Labor and Human Re-
sources ordered the bill favorably reported to the full Senate, 139 CONG. REc. D279, where
it is currently pending. A similar bill is also pending in the House of Representatives.
H.R. 25, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
Three events last summer slowed the political momentum of FOCA. First, the House
voted 255 to 178 to continue the ban on most Medicaid-funded abortions (the Hyde
Amendment). See Adam Clymer, Anti-Abortion Rally; Comeback Victory in Congress
Sends a Warning to Pro-Choice Lawmakers, N.Y. Tnvms, July 3, 1993, at A6; J. Jennings
Moss, Fund Ban Erodes Hope for Abortion Bill, WASH. TimEs, July 7, 1993, at Al. Sec-
ond, Senator Carol Moseley-Braun, D-Ill., withdrew her support for FOCA because she
believed it discriminates against poor women and minors. See Elaine S. Povich, Abortion
Rights Bill Rejected by Moseley-Braun, CH. TRIB., July 10, 1993, at 14; Robin Toner, Mid-
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the Supreme Court's landmark holding in Roe v. Wade,3 which prohib-
ited states from regulating abortion without a "compelling state inter-
est ' 4 for doing so. In codifying this holding, FOCA would effectively
overturn the Court's recent decision in Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.5 While purporting to reaffirm Roe's
"central holding,"'6 the Court in Casey held that states may regulate
abortion so long as state regulation does not impose an "undue bur-
den" on a woman's ability to terminate her pregnancy.7
The power to regulate abortion has historically been reserved to
the states under their police power.8 The state power to regulate
abortion has, of course, been restricted by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment when a regulation interferes with an indi-
vidual's right to privacy.9 However, state power in this area has never
before been completely curtailed by federal legislation. Passage of
FOCA would have far-reaching implications in the area of federal-
state relations; its passage would further the trend away from the sys-
die Ground on Abortion Shifting Into Terra Incognita, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1993, at Al.
Third, on August 3, 1993, Justice Byron White, who had consistently voted against a consti-
tutional right to abortion, was replaced by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who, during her
Senate confirmation hearings, acknowledged her support for a woman's right to choose an
abortion. See Sam Fulwood III, Ginsburg Confirmed as Second Woman on Supreme Court,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1993, at Al.
3. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4. Id. at 155. Although the bill explicitly states its purpose is to codify Roe and its
progeny, FOCA § 2(b), some might challenge the actual restrictions imposed by the bill as
going far beyond the holdings of these cases. See Constitutionality Hearings, supra note 2,
at 20-21 (testimony of John C. Harrison, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legal Counsel, Department of Justice). This Note assumes that courts would construe
FOCA as nothing more than a codification of Roe and its progeny prior to Webster v.
Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989), in accordance with its stated purpose.
5. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
6. Id. at 2804.
7. Id. at 2820-21. "An undue burden exists, and therefore a provision of law is inva-
lid, if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking
an abortion before the fetus attains viability." Id. at 2821. The application of this standard
would require upholding a substantial amount of state regulation that was invalid under
Roe's "compelling interest" standard. For example, in Casey, the Court upheld Penn-
sylvania's informed consent requirement and mandatory 24-hour waiting period, both of
which were similar to other statutes that had previously been held unconstitutional under
the Roe standard. Id. at 2826; see Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986); Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S.
416 (1983). For a detailed analysis of Casey's undue burden standard, see Alan E. Brown-
stein, How Rights are Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden Analysis in Constitutional
Doctrine, 45 HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming April 1994).
8. In a sardonic reference to what he perceived as usurpment of this traditional state
regulatory function, Senator Orrin Hatch called the identical 1992 version of the bill the
"Washington Knows Best Act of 1992." Constitutionality Hearings, supra note 2, at 3.
9. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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tem of federalism envisioned by the framers of the Constitution and
toward a powerful national government with wide-ranging powers.
This Note examines Congress's assertion that its power to regu-
late abortion comes from its "affirmative power both under section 8
of Article I of the Constitution... and under Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment of the Constitution to enact legislation to prohibit
State interference with interstate commerce, liberty, or equal protec-
tion of the laws." 10 The problem with Congress's enacting FOCA
under its power to regulate commerce is that the Commerce Clause1'
is a frail reed upon which to base such a broad and wide-ranging piece
of social legislation that infringes so heavily upon state sovereignty.
The courts would likely view Congress's attempt to base FOCA on its
commerce power as an abridgement of the states' right to govern
themselves, in violation of the Reserved Powers Clause of the Tenth
Amendment.' 2 Basing the legislation on Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment 3 would also present serious obstacles. Rather than en-
forcing the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause "by appro-
priate legislation," Congress would appear to be defining for itself the
clause's meaning, without regard to the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the clause. Congress's assumption of this role would raise
grave separation-of-powers issues that could render FOCA
unconstitutional.
Part I of this Note discusses whether Congress has the authority
under the Commerce Clause to pass FOCA and concludes that even if
it would otherwise fall within the commerce power, FOCA unconsti-
tutionally encroaches on state sovereignty in violation of the Tenth
Amendment. Part II addresses Congress's authority to enact FOCA
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, concluding that
FOCA is a valid exercise of Congress's Section 5 power; the federal-
ism principles that invalidate FOCA as an exercise of its power to
regulate commerce do not apply with equal force when Congress ex-
ercises its Section 5 power.
10. FOCA § 2(a)(4).
11. Section 8 of Article I of the Constitution provides: "The Congress shall have
Power... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States ... 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
12. See infra notes 28-95 and accompanying text.
13. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "The Congress shall have
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONS-r.
amend. XIV, § 5.
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I. The Freedom of Choice Act as an Exercise of Congress's
Commerce Power
A. The Scope of the Commerce Power
At first glance, Congress's assertion that it has the authority to
base such a wide-ranging piece of social legislation on its power to
regulate interstate commerce might seem absurd. During the last
sixty years, however, Congress's commerce power has become so
broad that it can support virtually any regulation as long as an argu-
ment can be made that the subject matter of the legislation touches
upon interstate commerce. The extent of this power is best illustrated
by the civil rights legislation of the 1960s.
In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,14 the owner and
operator of a 216-room downtown Atlanta motel brought a declara-
tory relief action attacking the constitutionality of Section 201 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (1964 Act).15 The Supreme Court upheld the
1964 Act as a valid exercise of Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause, despite the fact that the primary purpose of the act was to
eliminate discrimination, not to foster commercial activity. 16
The Court noted that the legislative history of the 1964 Act was
"replete with evidence of the burdens that discrimination by race or
color places upon interstate commerce."'1 7 For instance, "there was
evidence that th[e] uncertainty [of the availability of lodging to a Ne-
gro traveler that] stem[s] from racial discrimination had the effect of
discouraging travel on the part of a substantial portion of the Negro
community."' 8 As long as an exercise by Congress of its Commerce
Clause power removes impediments to interstate commerce, the fact
14. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
15. Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 201, 78 Stat. 241, 243 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000a (1988 & Supp. V 1993)). Section 201(a) provides: "All persons shall be entitled to
the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities .... and accommodations of
any place of public accommodation . . . without discrimination or segregation on the
ground of race, color, religion, or national origin." Section 201(b) defines an establishment
as "a place of public accommodation.., if its operations affect commerce, or if discrimina-
tion or segregation by it is supported by State action." According to Section 201(b), "any
inn, hotel, motel or other establishment which provides lodging to transient guests" is a
place of public accommodation whose "operations ... affect commerce," except when a
live-in owner rents five rooms or fewer. As defined in Section 201(c), "commerce" in-
cludes all interstate and foreign commerce.
16. The 1964 Act's "purpose was 'to promote the general welfare by eliminating dis-
crimination based on race, color, religion, or national origin in . . . public accommoda-
tions."' Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 245 (quoting H.R. Doc. No. 124, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. 14 (1963)).
17. Id. at 252. The interstate movement of people constitutes "commerce" that may
be regulated under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 255-56.
18. Id. at 253.
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that Congress also legislates against moral wrongs in the process does
not make the exercise unconstitutional.' 9
Applying the 1964 Act to the facts of the case, the Court held that
the discriminatory practices of the Heart of Atlanta Motel indeed af-
fected interstate commerce. The motel advertised outside of Georgia
using national advertising media, and was easily accessible by inter-
state highways. Approximately seventy-five percent of its registered
guests were from out of state.20 In response to the argument that op-
erating a motel is of a purely local character, the Court noted; "[I]f it
is interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it does not matter how
local the operation which applies the squeeze."''z
In order to constitutionally exercise its commerce power, Con-
gress only needs a rational basis for concluding that the regulated ac-
tivity in some way affects interstate commerce. 22 The fact that the real
purpose of particular legislation is to correct some social problem, and
not to foster interstate commerce, is irrelevant. Under this standard,
FOCA is a valid exercise of Congress's commerce power.
Because Congress could rationally conclude that disparate state
regulation of abortion would affect interstate commerce, FOCA
meets the extremely deferential Commerce Clause standard estab-
lished in Heart of Atlanta Motel. In Section 2(a)(2), FOCA explicitly
states Congress's findings that the diverse state regulations that have
arisen in the wake of Webster v. Reproductive Health Services23 oper-
ate cumulatively to
19. Id. at 257 (citing many other cases in which congressional activity directed against
moral wrongs was nevertheless upheld under the Commerce Clause, including The Lottery
Case, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (gambling); Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432 (1925) (crimi-
nal enterprises); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Mandel Bros., Inc., 359 U.S. 385 (1959) (decep-
tive practices in the sale of products); Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Ralston Purina
Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953) (fraudulent security transactions); Weeks v. United States, 245
U.S. 618 (1918) (misbranding of drugs); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (wages
and hours); United States v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 333 U.S. 169 (1948) (discrimination
against shippers); Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954) (protection of
small business from injurious price cutting); and Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960)
(racial discrimination by owners and managers of transit terminal restaurants)).
20. Id. at 243.
21. Id. at 258 (quoting United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n, 336 U.S.
460, 464 (1949)). In Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), the companion case to
Heart of Atlanta Motel, the Court again upheld the application of Section 201 of the 1964
Act to a local business-this time to Ollie's Barbecue, a Birmingham, Alabama restaurant
located 11 blocks from an interstate highway.
22. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 276
(1981) ("The court must defer to a congressional finding that a regulated activity affects
interstate commerce, if there is any rational basis for such a finding."); Heart of Atlanta
Motel, 379 U.S. at 258; McClung, 379 U.S. at 303-04.
23. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
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burden interstate commerce by forcing women to travel from States
in which legal barriers render contraception or abortion unavailable
or unsafe to other states or foreign nations; ... burden the medical
and economic resources of States that continue to provide women
with access to safe and legal abortion; and ... obstruct access to and
use of contraceptives and other medical techniques that are part of
interstate and international commerce. 24
These findings are supported by testimony from numerous medi-
cal experts,25 as well as by the amicus brief to the Supreme Court filed
in Webster by the attorneys general of California, Colorado, Massa-
chusetts, New York, Texas, and Vermont.2 6 Therefore, applying Heart
of Atlanta Motel's deferential standard of review, FOCA lies within
Congress's commerce power.2 7
B. Because FOCA Unduly Encroaches on State Sovereignty, It Is an
Unconstitutional Exercise of Congress's Commerce Power
The text of the Tenth Amendment has been described as "essen-
tially a tautology. '28 This description results from the language of the
24. FOCA § 2(a)(2)(A)(ii), (iv), (B).
25. See Freedom of Choice Act of 1989: Hearings on S. 1912 Before the Senate Comm.
on Labor and Human Resources, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1990).
26. Brief for Amicus Curiae at 16-17, Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492
U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-605). "An extraordinary burden will fall upon the states that con-
tinue to provide women with the right to choose to terminate their pregnancies. Such
states can anticipate an influx of non-residents seeking the abortion or related medical
services prohibited in their home states .... This will strain already overburdened health
care systems." Id.
27. John C. Harrison, who testified before the Senate Committee on Labor and
Human Resources on behalf of the Justice Department against the constitutionality of
FOCA, conceded that "the Supreme Court has interpreted the Commerce Clause so as to
give Congress broad power, and that some form of legislation .. .concerning abortion
could be grounded in that power." Constitutionality Hearings, supra note 2, at 11. Harri-
son goes on to say, however, that in the Bush administration's view, FOCA "is not an
appropriate exercise of the commerce power." Id.
This argument is rather disingenuous, for surely Harrison would agree that under the
deferential standard of review that is applied when reviewing Congress's exercise of its
Commerce Clause power, the opinion of the executive branch concerning the wisdom or
appropriateness of particular legislation is just as irrelevant as the opinion of the judiciary.
The only relevant issue is whether Congress can have a "rational basis for finding a chosen
regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of [interstate] commerce." McClung, 379
U.S. at 304.
There is, however, one important fact that distinguishes FOCA from the legislation at
issue in Heart of Atlanta Motel and its progeny, and perhaps justifies Harrison's comment:
FOCA is directed solely at the states, rather than at individuals. The significance of this
factor is explored in Subpart B, infra.
28. New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2418 (1992). The Tenth Amendment
provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohib-
ited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S.
CONST. amend. X.
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amendment, which merely reserves to the states that which has not
been taken from the states 29 However, the Tenth Amendment is
more than a restatement of the obvious. It is an expression of the tacit
constitutional scheme under which "the States retain substantial sov-
ereign powers... with which Congress does not readily interfere. '30
Thus, although FOCA may otherwise lie within Congress's commerce
power, the Tenth Amendment would still render FOCA unconstitu-
tional if it "oversteps the boundary between federal and state
authority."31
The notion that an otherwise valid exercise of the commerce
power would be unconstitutional if it unduly encroached upon state
sovereignty was advanced in the 1976 case of National League of Cit-
ies v. Usery.32 The issue in National League of Cities was the constitu-
tionality of a 1974 congressional amendment extending the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA), which set minimum wage and maximum hours
constraints, to cover all state employees. 33 The Supreme Court, ex-
pressly overruling an eight-year-old precedent,34 held the statute un-
constitutional because it "directly displace[d] the States' freedom to
structure integral operations in areas of traditional government func-
tions. '35 The Court explained that it "has never doubted that there
are limits upon the power of Congress to override state sovereignty,
even when exercising its otherwise plenary powers to tax or to regu-
late commerce. '36
29. See id.; United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643, 649 (1961); Case v. Bowles, 327
U.S. 92, 102 (1946); Oklahoma ex reL Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 534
(1941).
30. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395,2401 (1991); see also New York, 112 S. Ct. at
2425 (collecting cases); Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990) (stating that "the States
possess sovereignty concurrent with that of the Federal Government"); Metcalf & Eddy v.
Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514,523 (1926) (stating that "neither government may destroy the other
nor curtail in any substantial manner the exercise of its powers"); Texas v. White, 74 U.S.
(7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1869) (stating that "the preservation of the States, and the maintenance
of their governments, are as much within the design and care of the Constitution as the
preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the National government").
31. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2419.
32. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
33. Id. at 836.
34. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196-97 (1968) (upholding the extension of FLSA
to cover certain public employees, including those at state hospitals, institutions, and
schools).
35. National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852. Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion of
the Court, in which Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Stewart joined. Justice
Blackmun also joined the Court's opinion, but indicated that he was "not untroubled by
certain possible implications of the Court's opinion." Id. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens dissented.
36. Id. at 842-44 (citing Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975) ("The
[Tenth] Amendment expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may not
exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to function
March 1994]
All federal regulation, however, encroaches on state sovereignty
to some degree. The task of the courts after National League of Cities
thus became one of distinguishing between valid federal legislation
and legislation so repugnant to principles of federalism that it was un-
constitutional. In Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n,37 the Court attempted to tackle this problem.
In Hodel, the Court enunciated four conditions that must be satis-
fied before the National League of Cities principle could be applied to
strike down an exercise of Congress's commerce power. First, the fed-
eral statute at issue must regulate "the 'States as States.' 38 Second,
the federal statute must "address matters that are indisputably 'attri-
bute[s] of state sovereignty.' ' '39 Third, state compliance with the fed-
eral law had to "directly impair [the States'] ability 'to structure
integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions. '' 40
Fourth, the relation of state and federal interests could not be such
that "the nature of the federal interest.., justifies state submission."'4'
This four-part test proved to be unmanageable. The third part of
the test, which distinguished between "traditional" and "nontradi-
tional" government functions, was particularly problematic.42 Of the
four cases attempting to apply the National League of Cities principle,
effectively in a federal system."); New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 587-88 (1946)
(plurality opinion) (rejecting the proposition that Congress could impose taxes on the
states so long as it did so in a nondiscriminatory manner); Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S.
(7 Wall.) 71, 76 (1869); Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1869)).
37. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
38. Id. at 287 (quoting National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 854).
39. Id. at 287-88 (quoting National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 845).
40. Id. at 288 (quoting National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 852).
41. Id. at 288 n.29. The federal legislation at stake in Hodel involved regulation of
surface mining that had the effect of displacing state regulation except when the state
adopted the federal regulation. Applying its newly formulated four-part test to the facts of
the case, the Court unanimously upheld the federal legislation, holding that the first condi-
tion was not met because the regulation was not "directed to the States as States." Id. at
288.
42. As one commentator noted:
"Traditional" might be synonymous with "customary" as of some particular date,
e.g., 1791, when the Bill of Rights was adopted. Alternatively, "traditional" might
be synonymous with "conservative," i.e., with minimalist theories of proper gov-
ernmental functions: to provide laws mediating claims of private right, a police
force to maintain order, and a court system for adjudications, and no more.
Under either view, if a state undertook something new in the provision of public
service.... it would have to yield to Congress the power to determine the terms.
Either way of drawing the line would pose problems for several Justices who
would understandably resist a notion that the Constitution embeds some bright
line conservative principle respecting the "proper" role of state government.
William W. Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1709, 1716-17
(1985).
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not one invalidated a federal regulation. 43 In the fifth case, Garcia v.
San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,4 the Court abandoned
the National League of Cities doctrine altogether.45
In Garcia, the Court emphasized the difficulty in applying the
third part of the National League of Cities test, stating that none "of
the alternative standards that might be employed to distinguish be-
tween protected and unprotected governmental functions appear
manageable. ' '46 The problem, according to the Court, was that "[a]ny
rule of state immunity that looks to the 'traditional,' 'integral,' or 'nec-
essary' nature of governmental functions inevitably invites an
unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which state poli-
cies it favors and which ones it dislikes." 47
In discarding the National League of Cities principle, the Court
reasoned that the sovereignty of the states is better protected by "the
structure of the Federal Government itself" than by judicial review. 48
Since the states have significant influence in the Senate through equal
representation regardless of population, as well as influence over the
Presidency through their control of electoral qualifications, the Court
was convinced that state sovereignty would be preserved even without
the participation of the federal judiciary.49
Thus, after Garcia, it appeared as though the Court would no
longer get involved in issues of federalism, having essentially abdi-
cated the field.50 However, as the Garcia dissenters had promised,51
the Court returned to this issue just seven years later in New York v.
United States.52
New York concerned the constitutionality of the Low-Level Radi-
oactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 (the Radioactive
Waste Act) 5 3 Faced with a major shortage of disposal sites for low-
43. Hodel, 452 U.S. at 276-77 (unanimously upholding federal regulation); United
Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678, 682 (1982) (same); Federal Energy Regu-
latory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 745 (1982) (Justice Blackmun joining the Na-
tional League of Cities dissenters to rule five to four in favor of the federal legislation);
Equal Employment Opportunities Comm'n v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 229 (1983) (same).
44. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
45. Id. at 531.
46. Id. at 543.
47. Id. at 546.
48. Id. at 550.
49. Id. at 550-54.
50. Van Alstyne, supra note 42, at 1723.
51. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[The National League of
Cities] principle... will, I am confident, in time again command the support of a majority
of this Court."); see also id. at 589 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("I would not shirk the duty
acknowledged by National League of Cities and its progeny, and I share Justice Rehnquist's
belief that this Court will in time again assume its constitutional responsibility.").
52. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
53. Id. at 2414.
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level radioactive waste,54 Congress enacted what amounted to a com-
promise between states that had disposal sites and states that did
not.5 5 One of the provisions of the Radioactive Waste Act, the "take
title" provision, provided:
If a State ... in which low-level radioactive waste is generated is
unable to provide for the disposal of all such waste generated within
such State [either by itself or in cooperation with other States]...
by January 1, 1996, each State in which such waste is generated,
upon the request of the generator or owner of the waste, shall take
title to the waste ... and shall be liable for all damages directly or
indirectly incurred by such generator or owner as a consequence of
the failure of the State to take possession of the waste .... 56
In a declaratory relief action, the Supreme Court held this take
title provision unconstitutional because it was "inconsistent with the
federal structure of our Government established by the Constitu-
tion."' 57 Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor distinguished Na-
tional League of Cities and Garcia, stating that those cases "concerned
the authority of Congress to subject state governments to generally
applicable laws."'58 In contrast, through the take title provision at is-
sue in New York, Congress was attempting to force the states to regu-
late in a particular way.59 Thus the Court considered itself free to
analyze, without regard to the Garcia holding, whether a federal stat-
ute that "offers a state government no option other than that of imple-
menting legislation enacted by Congress" violates the Tenth
Amendment.60
The Court began with the proposition that "Congress may not
simply 'commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by di-
rectly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory pro-
gram."'' 61 According to the Court, the Framers had envisioned a
national government that could act directly upon the individual by
regulating or prohibiting certain acts, but could not act indirectly by
forcing states to regulate or prohibit those acts. 62 Congress can en-
courage or entice a state to act in a particular way-for example, by
attaching conditions to the receipt of federal funds,63 or, when Con-
gress has the authority to regulate private activity, by threatening to
54. Only three states-Nevada, South Carolina, and Washington-had disposal sites.
Id.
55. Id. at 2415.
56. Id. at 2416 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d)(2)(C) (Supp. V 1993)).
57. Id. at 2429.
58. Id. at 2420.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 2429.
61. Id. at 2420 (quoting Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288 (alteration in original)).
62. Id. at 2421-23.
63. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987).
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preempt state law with federal regulation. 64 However, Congress may
not compel a state to act in a particular way through outright
coercion.65
The Court asserted that the prudential benefits of federalism
were irrelevant to its analysis, because its task consisted "not of devis-
ing our preferred system of government, but of understanding and ap-
plying the framework set forth in the Constitution. '66 Despite this
assertion, the Court proceeded to describe the benefits of the constitu-
tional structure that prohibits Congress from compelling the states to
regulate in a particular way:
Where Congress encourages state regulation rather than compelling
it, state governments remain responsive to the local electorate's
preferences; state officials remain accountable to the people.
By contrast, where the Federal Government compels States to
regulate, the accountability of both state and federal officials is di-
minished .... [I]f the decision turns out to be detrimental or unpop-
ular[,] ... it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public
disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory
program may remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of
their decision.67
Applying these principles to the take title provision, the Court
stated, "The take title provision offers state governments a 'choice' of
either accepting ownership of waste or regulating according to the in-
structions of Congress. ' 68 Forcing the states to undertake either of
these options individually would be to "commandeer" state govern-
ments for federal regulatory purposes. 69 Because "[a] choice between
two unconstitutionally coercive regulatory techniques is no choice at
all," the Court held that the take title provision was an unconstitu-
tional exercise of Congress's commerce power.70
FOCA, like the take title provision of the Radioactive Waste Act,
is directed at the states, not at private individuals. Therefore, FOCA
is arguably distinguishable from the statutes at issue in National
League of Cities and Garcia. However, FOCA is also distinguishable
from the statute at issue in New York. While the take title provision
commanded the states to enact legislation, FOCA prevents the states
from acting. Therefore, to determine whether FOCA is a valid exer-
cise of Congress's commerce power, these distinctions must be ana-
lyzed and applied to the unique circumstances presented by FOCA.
64. See, e.g., Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288.
65. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2424.
66. Id. at 2418.
67. Id. at 2424.
68. Id. at 2428.
69. Id..
70. Id.
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Political accountability is not undermined when Congress pre-
vents the states from regulating. The New York Court rationalized its
holding by arguing that if Congress were allowed to command the
states to regulate, the political accountability of both federal and state
officials would be diminished. This rationale does not apply with
equal force in the case of FOCA because, in passing FOCA, Congress
is not hiding from the full view of the public behind the cloak of state
regulation. If FOCA turns out to be detrimental or unpopular, the
only actor at which the public would be able to point a finger would
be Congress; the states would not have acted at all. Unlike the take
title provision, passing FOCA does not insulate Congress from polit-
ical fallout caused by coercing the states to act. In fact, quite the op-
posite would be the case. By essentially preempting the field of
abortion regulation, Congress's enactment of FOCA would lift the
political responsibility for regulating abortion off the shoulders of
state officials and place it onto its own.
However, the distinction between the take title provision at issue
in New York, by which Congress forced the states to act in a particular
way, and FOCA, by which Congress would prevent the states from
acting in a particular way, is largely formalistic. Although it would not
commandeer the state legislatures to further its aims through FOCA,
Congress would compel the states to take a particular course of inac-
tion. It is difficult to see how this would be looked on any more favor-
ably than the take title provision by those who wish to preserve the
delicate balance of the regulatory power of government between the
states and Congress. According to the New York Court, "[T]he Con-
stitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress the abil-
ity to require the States to govern according to Congress's
instructions."'71 Because it directly instructs the states, FOCA would
appear to fall within New York's holding.
However, New York appears to have left undisturbed the holding
in Garcia-that state sovereignty is better protected by "the structure
of the Federal government itself" than by the courts. The New York
Court distinguished Garcia based on the fact that Garcia concerned
the ability of Congress to subject the states to generally applicable
laws, as opposed to laws directed solely at the states. The New York
dissenters severely criticized this distinction, stating:
[O]ne would be hard-pressed to read the spirited exchanges be-
tween the Court and dissenting Justices in National League of Cities
... and in Garcia ... as having been based on the distinction now
drawn by the Court. An incursion on state sovereignty hardly
71. Id. at 2421.
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seems more constitutionally acceptable if the federal statute that
"commands" specific action also applies to private parties. 72
Regardless of the validity of this distinction drawn by the New York
Court, does it apply in the case of FOCA?
Although its commands are directed at the states, the goal of
FOCA is to create a statutory right for individuals-the right of a wo-
man to choose to terminate her pregnancy. It is different from the
statute at issue in Garcia in that FOCA does not regulate private ac-
tivity to the same extent as state activity. However, it is also different
from the take title provision in New York in that FOCA seeks not to
compel state action, but instead to preempt state law in the area of
abortion. Thus, it is difficult to see how the principles underlying Gar-
cia would not apply in a constitutional challenge to FOCA.
Even if FOCA is covered by Garcia, however, the holding in Gar-
cia should either be narrowed to exclude the situation presented in
FOCA, or overturned completely. The factor that led the Garcia
Court to overturn National League of Cities was the difficulty the
Court experienced in drawing the line between protected and unpro-
tected state functions.73 However, in neither the case of FOCA nor
the take title provision at issue in New York would such a determina-
tion present a problem. In both cases, the federal statute is directed at
the states' legislative functions, which under any standard would be
"protected" functions. Although Garcia's criticism of the test in Na-
tional League of Cities and Hodel may have been valid,7 4 the Garcia
majority never adequately refuted the constitutional principles behind
the test.75 As evidenced by the holding of the Court in New York,
while National League of Cities itself may have been overruled, the
principles behind that case remain sound,76 and should be invoked to
invalidate FOCA as an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's com-
merce power.
72. Id. at 2441 (White, J., joined by Blackmun and Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
73. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
74. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERiCAN CONSTITUTONAL LAW § 5-22, at 389-93 (2d
ed. 1988).
75. Professor Van Alstyne has argued that because the test was poorly formulated, the
principles behind National League of Cities were subject to "premature and unwarranted
hostility." Van Alstyne, supra note 42, at 1717. He criticizes the Garcia court, arguing:
Several Justices, respectfully, did not try to make it work. Rather, those Justices
originally in dissent from Justice Rehnquist's analysis failed to treat it in the man-
ner the Court has otherwise wisely tended to do in equivalent circumstances asso-
ciated with great cases: not as the final word on the subject, but as the first words.
Id. (citing New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1954); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Cooley v. Board of Wardens,
53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851)).
76. See TRIBE, supra note 74, § 5-22, at 388 ("The concerns that underlay National
League of Cities, then, were real ones. The political safeguards of federalism cannot always
be counted on to prevent abuses of federal legislative power.").
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The holding in Garcia was based on the notion that the judiciary
should defer completely to the political process when considering is-
sues of federalism because the political process is better able to bal-
ance concerns of the states against concerns of the nation.77 This
conception of the role of the judiciary in federalism was developed by
Professor Jesse Choper,78 and stands in stark contrast to the tradi-
tional role of the Court with respect to issues of individual liberties.
Professor Choper has argued, "A primary justification for judicial
review of claimed infringements of individual liberty is the teaching of
theory and experience that these constitutionally secured interests are
unlikely to receive sympathetic consideration in the political pro-
cess."'79 The same cannot be said for federalism questions80 because
the states enjoy adequate representation in the Senate and, through
the electoral college and the presidential nominating process, over the
Presidency.81 According to Choper, history has taught that due to this
power of the states over the national government, "the proliferation
of national programs has neither led to a centralized autocracy nor
resulted in the concentration of federal power to the exclusion of the
individual states. '82 Therefore, because the political process is ade-
quate to protect states' rights, the Court should avoid "needless adju-
dication of ... [this] troublesome category of constitutional issues,"
and save its strength to instead address issues of individual liberty. 83
The Court relied heavily on this argument in Garcia.
This reasoning suffers from the following flaw: "The fact that
Congress generally does not transgress constitutional limits on its
power to reach state activities does not make judicial review any less
necessary to rectify the cases in which it does do S0. ''84 If Congress
oversteps its bounds with respect to the states, the Court has a duty to
see that the "federalism so conceived and so carefully cultivated by
the Framers of our Constitution is to remain meaningful." 85
Professor Choper counters by arguing that if a situation arises in
which Congress and the President join to greatly infringe upon states'
77. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556; supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
78. Jesse H. Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-d-Vis the States: The
Dispensibility of Judicial Review, 86 YALE L.J. 1552 (1977).
79. Id. at 1560 (citing Jesse H. Choper, On the Warren Court and Judicial Review, 17
CATH. U. L. REV. 20, 40-41 (1967)).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1561-64.
82. Id. at 1568.
83. Id. at 1579.
84. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 566-67 (Powell, J., dissenting).
85. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 581 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Van Alstyne, supra
note 42, at 1724 ("Stripped of its elegance, Garcia proposes the piecemeal repeal of judicial
review.").
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rights, "it is probably futile to rely on the Court to right the matter. '8 6
However, this is not a sufficient justification for the complete abdica-
tion of judicial responsibility to interpret and uphold the
Constitution.8 7
Professor William Van Alstyne has suggested an alternative to
National League of Cities' "traditional-nontraditional" distinction
when trying to determine the extent that congressional legislation may
infringe on state sovereignty.88 Rather than creating an unjustifiable
distinction between "traditional" and "nontraditional" functions, Van
Alstyne suggests that all functions the state or local government finds
consistent with the public welfare and unsuitable to leave to the pri-
vate sector ought to be provided equal Tenth Amendment protec-
tion.89 If Congress is going to interfere with these functions, he
argues, it should have to justify "its authority with a judicially accepta-
ble reason in every such case, and not simply in those involving 'tradi-
tional' public services as previously defined." 90 This justification
would have to relate "to the imperatives of things otherwise within the
power of Congress to command." 91 Under this view, the reason Con-
gress gives to justify an encroachment on state functions when exercis-
ing its commerce power would have to relate to commerce.92
Under Van Alstyne's test, FOCA clkarly violates the Tenth
Amendment. The state activity regulated by FOCA cannot be consid-
ered commercial in any sense. Although Congress could rationally
conclude that disparate state regulations affect commerce, it could not
claim that this commercial effect is sufficient to justify such a substan-
tial encroachment on the states' authority to enact social legislation
under their police power. To justify its command to the states, Con-
gress would have to rely on its own interest in protecting the health
and welfare of women. Since these reasons are unrelated to com-
merce, they should not be used to override states' equal interests in
protecting the health and welfare of their citizens.
86. Choper, supra note 78, at 1606.
87. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 567 (Powell, J., dissenting) (stating that the Garcia major-
ity ignored the teaching of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803), that
"[it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is" with respect to the constitutionality of acts of Congress).
88. Van Alstyne, supra note 42, at 1717-19.
89. Id. at 1719-20.
90. Id. at 1718.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1718 n.40 ("Under this view, the more the state's own commercial practices
(e.g., making cars for sale at market prices to compete with G.M. or Ford) mingle in na-
tional commercial markets, the greater its subordination to such rules of trade as Congress
may otherwise see fit to impose upon that trade."). Professor Van Alstyne's approach is
similar to the "balancing approach" suggested by Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in
National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 856.
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For those who approve of the intended result of FOCA, it is
tempting to sacrifice the structural principles of federalism in favor of
the concrete individual freedoms FOCA would provide. However, as
Justice O'Connor has written, "The Constitution protects us from our
own best intentions: It divides power among sovereigns and among
branches of government precisely so that we may resist the temptation
to concentrate power in one location as an expedient solution to the
crisis of the day."'93
Freedom of choice advocates should not be so willing to relin-
quish the protections of federalism and allow Congress to regulate
abortion through its commerce power. If Congress has the power to
regulate abortion under its commerce power it could just as easily re-
strict abortions at the national level. Any law that was uniform would
be a valid exercise of Congress's commerce power as long as it did not
violate Casey's "undue burden" test. For instance, under its com-
merce power, Congress could pass a national informed consent re-
quirement or a twenty-four hour waiting period.94 One's position on
the abortion issue should not cloud the serious federalism concerns at
stake. National abortion regulation through Congress's commerce
power is an illegitimate restriction on the ability of the states to re-
solve the issue for themselves. 95
H. The Freedom of Choice Act as an Exercise of Congress's
Section 5 Power
In addition to its Commerce Clause power, Congress asserts the
authority to pass FOCA under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.96 In accordance with Section 5, FOCA purports to enforce the
due process and equal protection guarantees of Section 1 of the Four-
93. New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2434.
94. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2721, 2822-26 (1992).
95. Professor Tribe, who testified that FOCA was a valid exercise of Congress's com-
merce power at the May 1992 hearings, testified before the Senate on the abortion issue in
1981: "If these matters are divisive, if they are unclear, why try to resolve them nationally?
Why not decentralize?" Constitutionality Hearings, supra note 2, at 15 (citing The Human
Life Bill: Hearings on S. 158 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 245 (1981)). Although FOCA would impose
the same restriction on the states' ability to resolve the abortion issue for themselves re-
gardless of whether it was based on Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Com-
merce Clause, such a restriction based on Section 5 is legitimate because of the unique
responsibility given Congress by the states to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. See
infra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
96. FOCA § 2(a)(4). Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "The Con-
gress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
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teenth Amendment.97 If FOCA is a valid exercise of Congress's Sec-
tion 5 power, it would overcome the Tenth Amendment-based
infirmities that render it an invalid exercise of Congress's Article I
commerce power.
Because of the unique responsibility given to Congress under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, principles of state sover-
eignty do not limit the exercise of the powers created by that provi-
sion.98 "[P]rinciples of federalism that might otherwise be an obstacle
to congressional authority are necessarily overridden by the power to
'enforce the [Fourteenth Amendment] 'by appropriate legislation.' 99
Therefore, "Congress is not limited by the same Tenth Amendment
constraints that circumscribe the exercise of its Commerce Clause
powers."' ° Consequently, the fact that the Tenth Amendment invali-
dates FOCA as an exercise of Congress's commerce power does not
preclude FOCA from being a valid exercise of Congress's power
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This conclusion is logically sound for two reasons. First, the
states ratified the Fourteenth Amendment after the Tenth. In so do-
ing, the states explicitly gave up their sovereignty to the extent neces-
sary for Congress to enforce the provisions of the later amendment.
Second, as detailed in this Part, Congress's Section 5 power may only
be invoked to enhance10' and enforce the specific individual liberties
of the Fourteenth Amendment. This is in contrast to its commerce
power, which, if left unchecked, may extend into virtually every area
of individual and governmental activity. Therefore, although Con-
gress may substantially intrude upon state sovereignty under Section
5, it may only do so in the narrowly defined area of Fourteenth
Amendment liberties.
97. FOCA § 2(a)(4). Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "No State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
98. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879).
99. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980) (holding that Congress
may provide for private suits to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment); see
also Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) ("Congress may[,] ... for purposes of
enforcing.., the Fourteenth Amendment, provide for private suits against States or state
officials which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts." (citations omitted)).
100. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226,243 n.18 (1983) (citing City of Rome, 446 U.S. at
179).
101. Under the "ratchet theory" of Congress's Section 5 power, Congress may only
enlarge the individual liberties of the Fourteenth Amendment, and may not limit them.
See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
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A. Katzenbach v. Morgan
The leading case on the scope of Congress's Section 5 power is
Katzenbach v. Morgan.10 2 In Morgan, registered voters in New York
City brought suit challenging the constitutionality of Section 4(e) of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965.103 Section 4(e) provided that no per-
son who had successfully completed the sixth grade in an accredited
Spanish-speaking school in Puerto Rico could be denied the right to
vote in any election because of an inability to read or write English.
This statute effectively invalidated literacy requirements enacted by
the New York legislature. The voters argued that the statute could
not be justified as a measure enforcing the Equal Protection Clause of
the Amendment unless the Court determined that New York's literacy
requirement itself violated the Equal Protection Clause. 1°4 However,
seven years prior to Morgan, the Court had upheld just such a literacy
requirement against an equal protection challenge.10 5 Therefore, ac-
cording to the voters, the Voters Rights Act of 1965 could not be sus-
tained as an appropriate exercise of Congress's Section 5 power.
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that Section 5 gave Con-
gress a much more expansive power than that envisioned by the New
York voters. "By including § 5 the draftsmen sought to grant to Con-
gress, by a specific provision applicable to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the same broad powers expressed in the Necessary and Proper
Clause. '10 6 Therefore, determining what constitutes "appropriate leg-
islation" under Section 5 entails referring to the standard under the
Necessary and Proper Clause, as set forth by Chief Justice John Mar-
shall in McCulloch v. Maryland.10 7 Section 5 can thus be seen as "a
positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its
discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to
secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 08
Having determined the scope of Congress's power, the Court
proceeded to present two different rationales for its conclusion that
Section 4(e) of the 1965 Voting Rights Act met the McCulloch stan-
dard of "appropriate legislation." First, Congress could have reason-
ably concluded that by giving Spanish-speaking Puerto Ricans the
right to vote, it was securing for the entire Puerto Rican community
102. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)(e)(1), (2) (Supp. V 1993).
104. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 648.
105. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51-53 (1959).
106. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 650; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
107. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 650-51; see McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,
421 (1819) ("Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohib-
ited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.").
108. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651.
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the ability to prevent discrimination in the provision of services such
as public schools, public housing, and law enforcement. 10 9 This ration-
ale, which is consistent with earlier Court decisions,1 0 merely recog-
nizes that Congress may pass a prophylactic law aimed at prohibiting a
judicially determined Fourteenth Amendment violation."'
The second rationale provided by the Court was that Congress
could have reasonably concluded that New York's English literacy re-
quirement itself, as applied to persons with a sixth grade education in
Spanish-speaking Puerto Rican schools, violated the Equal Protection
Clause, notwithstanding the Court's contrary holding in Lassiter v.
Northampton County Board of Elections.1 2 This second rationale is
controversial" 3 because it implies that, contrary to the holding of
Marbury v. Madison, Congress may interpret for itself provisions of
the Constitution." 4 Furthermore, besides "[standing] Marbury v.
Madison on its head by judicial deference to congressional interpreta-
tion of the Constitution,"" 5 a second problem exists with this ration-
ale: If Congress is given discretion to determine for itself the
substance of the Fourteenth Amendment, there is no logical reason
why Congress could not use "its § 5 'discretion' by enacting statutes so
as in effect to dilute equal protection and due process decisions of
th[e] Court.""16
Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Morgan addresses this lat-
ter argument by proposing a so-called "ratchet theory" of Congress's
Section 5 power: "Congress's power under § 5 is limited to adopting
measures to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment; § 5 grants
Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guaran-
tees. 11 7 However, as Professor Laurence Tribe has pointed out, Jus-
tice Brennan "did not fully explain.., why congressional power was
so limited; nor did [he] attempt to reconcile with the principle of judi-
cial review even a one-way power authoritatively to construe the
Constitution."118
109. Id. at 652-53.
110. E.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 384 U.S. 641, 650-51 (1966) (applying the Mc-
Culloch standard to uphold the Voting Rights Act under the Fifteenth Amendment, which
has an enforcement clause identical to that of the Fourteenth Amendment).
111. See TRIBE, supra note 74, § 5-14, at 341.
112. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 653-56.
113. See infra commentaries collected in note 119.
114. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 143 (1803) ("[It is the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
115. William Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protec-
tion, 27 STAN. L. REv. 603, 606 (1975); see also TRIBE, supra note 74, § 5-14, at 342.
116. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 668 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 651 n.10.
118. TRIBE, supra note 74, § 5-14, at 343.
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Legal commentators have attempted to provide a justification for
Morgan's second rationale, to defend Justice Brennan's "ratchet the-
ory," and to propose objective limits on Congress's Morgan power." 9
All of their attempts fall short for one reason or another. 120 This in-
ability, combined with critical Supreme Court commentary on the
subject,' 2' lead to the conclusion that the validity of Morgan's second
rationale is in doubt.
B. FOCA Is Constitutional Under Morgan
Fortunately, a resolution of the controversy surrounding Mor-
gan's second rationale is not necessary for a determination of the va-
lidity of FOCA, 22 because FOCA is a valid exercise of Congress's
Section 5 power under the first Morgan rationale. FOCA can be seen
119. See, e.g., Archibald Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations,
40 U. CIN. L. REV. 199 (1970) ("fact-finding theory"); Archibald Cox, Foreword: Constitu-
tional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 106-08
(1966) (same); Cohen, supra note 115 ("liberty-federalism theory"); Samuel Estreicher,
Congressional Power and Constitutional Rights: Reflections on Proposed "Human Life
Legislation," 68 VA. L. REV. 333, 429-33 (1982) ("statutory rights theory"); Robert A.
Burt, Miranda and Title II: A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 81 ("norm
elaborator theory"); Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Under-
enforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978) (same); see also TRIBE,
supra note 74, § 5-14, at 266-71 (discussing generally all the theories, and adopting the
"statutory rights theory").
120. See TRIBE, supra note 74, § 5-14, at 270-71 (criticizing all but the "statutory rights
theory"). For further criticism of the "factfinding theory," see Burt, supra note 119, at 105-
06; Cohen, supra note 119, at 612-13; Estreicher, supra note 119, at 425-26; Sager, supra
note 119, at 1232-35. For further criticism of the "norm elaborator theory," see Estreicher,
supra note 119, at 427-29. The only theory that has not been subject to heavy criticism has
been the "statutory rights theory" embraced by Estreicher and Tribe. See supra note 119.
However, this theory begs the question of what limits on congressional authority Section 5
places, and how the phrase "enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this arti-
cle" should be interpreted.
121. In dissent in EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983), Chief Justice Burger, joined
by Justices Rehnquist, Powell, and O'Connor, indicated disapproval with this second Mor-
gan rationale, stating:
Allowing Congress to protect constitutional rights statutorily that it has indepen-
dently defined fundamentally alters our scheme of government. Although the
South Carolina v. Katzenbach line of cases may be read to allow Congress a de-
gree of flexibility in deciding what the Fourteenth Amendment safeguards, I have
always read Oregon v. Mitchell as finally imposing a limitation on the extent to
which Congress may substitute its own judgment for that of the states and assume
this Court's "role of final arbiter."
Id. at 262 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 205 (1970)
(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
122. The Senate Report accompanying FOCA indicates that Congress may actually be
attempting to base its authority under the second line of reasoning in Morgan by finding
that state regulations which are invalid under Roe v. Wade's strict scrutiny standard, but
not invalid under Casey's undue burden test, violate the due process and equal protection
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment:
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as a preventative law, aimed at states that pass laws which, though
constitutional themselves, may result in Fourteenth Amendment vio-
lations through their cumulative operation.
Congress has reasonably determined that state regulations which
violate Roe's "compelling state interest" test, but pass Casey's "undue
burden" test, would prevent certain women from obtaining safe, legal
abortions. Because of this "forced pregnancy," Congress has deter-
mined that some women will face impermissible gender discrimina-
tion.123 As the plurality recognized in Casey, "The ability of women
to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has
been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives."'1 24
Furthermore, Congress has reasonably concluded that "state and local
restrictions on the ability of women to obtain legal abortions would
also result in discrimination against low-income women, a dispropor-
tionate number of whom are members of racial or ethnic minori-
ties," 1'5 and that "restrictions by individual States on the right of
women to obtain safe and legal abortions would have profound impli-
cations for freedom of travel.' 26
Because it can be based on these findings, FOCA presents no
separation-of-powers problems. Analogous to the first Morgan ra-
tionale, Congress is not interpreting for itself the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Instead, it is using its "specially informed
legislative competence"' 27 to determine that certain state regulations,
although not unconstitutional in themselves, will result through their
enforcement in the deprivation of individual rights guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment.'2 Therefore, FOCA is a valid exercise of
It is the Committee's view, based on evidence presented to Congress and dis-
cussed herein, that any restriction of a woman's right to terminate a pregnancy
which would have been invalidated under the strict scrutiny standard of Roe will
make it significantly harder to exercise the very "liberty" that a majority of the
Court in Casey recognized was involved and will in fact constitute an impermissi-
ble burden on this liberty, particularly when considered in cumulation with the
other, similar restrictions of which Congress, as a legislature, may take notice in a
manner impossible for a federal court reviewing the record in an individual case.
S. REP. No. 321, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1992).
123. See id. at 29 (maintaining that state restrictions on abortion "affect constitutional
guarantees of gender equality").
124. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2721, 2809 (1992) (citing ROSALIND P.
PETcHEsKY, ABORTION AND WOMAN'S CHOICE 109, 133 n.7 (rev. ed. 1990)).
125. S. REP. No. 321 at 29.
126. Id.
127. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 656.
128. Specifically, Congress has concluded the state regulations "would directly advance
the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of 'liberty,' 'equal protection of the laws,' 'due
process,' the 'right to travel' and enjoyment of the privileges or immunities of national
citizenship." S. REP. No. 321 at 30.
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Congress's Section 5 power under the well-settled first rationale of
Morgan.129
Conclusion
Congress has constitutional authority to pass FOCA under Sec-
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although FOCA prohibits
states from enacting regulations that would otherwise be upheld under
Casey's "undue burden" standard, FOCA does not pose a separation-
of-powers problem. In passing FOCA, Congress has reasonably con-
cluded that the prohibited state regulations would result in impermis-
sible gender discrimination, race discrimination, and restrictions on
freedom of travel. Therefore, Congress is not defining for itself the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment independent of the Court's
decisions; instead, it is passing a prophylactic law aimed at prohibiting
judicially determined Fourteenth Amendment violations.
Seen in this light, FOCA is palatable with respect to both the
individual's rights and states' rights. It expands a woman's right to
choose whether or not to have an abortion, but does not do so at the
cost of setting a precedent whereby Congress could just as easily re-
strict that right on a national scale. Although passing FOCA under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment intrudes upon state auton-
omy, it does so only to the extent that the states have explicitly surren-
dered their autonomy to the very important and narrowly defined
goals of the Fourteenth Amendment.
As an exercise of Congress's commerce power, however, FOCA
could not withstand constitutional challenge. Congress could ration-
ally conclude that disparate state regulations would affect interstate
commerce, thereby bringing FOCA within the normal ambit of Con-
gress's commerce power. However, principles of federalism inherent
in the Tenth Amendment prohibit a regulation that so drastically en-
croaches upon state sovereignty for the sake of such a marginal fed-
eral commerce interest. The commercial impacts of these state
regulations are completely overshadowed by their profound effects on
the health and welfare of women-concerns with which the states are
at least as equally qualified as the federal government to deal. To rest
this social legislation upon the commerce power is, therefore, an af-
front to the autonomy of the states. To the extent Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority would hold the contrary, it
must be overruled.
129. For another analysis of the constitutionality of FOCA, see Ira C. Lupu, Statutes
Revolving in Constitutional Law Orbits, 79 VA. L. REv. 1, 37-46 (1993).
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THE FREEDOM OF CHOICE ACT
Appendix: The Freedom of Choice Act of 1993
SECTION 1. SHORT TrrLE.
This Act may be cited as the "Freedom of Choice Act of 1993."
SECTION 2. CONGRESSIONAL STATEMENT OF FINDrNGS AND
PURPOSE.
(a) FINDINGS. - Congress finds the following:
(1) The 1973 Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade
established constitutionally based limits on the power of
States to restrict the right of a woman to choose to terminate
a pregnancy. Under the strict scrutiny standard enunciated
in Roe v. Wade, States were required to demonstrate that
laws restricting the right of a woman to choose to terminate a
pregnancy were the least restrictive means available to
achieve a compelling State interest. Since 1989, the Supreme
Court has no longer applied the strict scrutiny standard in
reviewing challenges to the constitutionality of State laws re-
stricting such rights.
(2) As a result of the Supreme Court's recent modifica-
tion of the strict scrutiny standard enunciated in Roe v.
Wade, certain States have restricted the right of women to
choose to terminate a pregnancy or to utilize some forms of
contraception, and these restrictions operate cumulatively
to-
(A)(i) increase the number of illegal or medically less
safe abortions, often resulting in physical impairment, loss of
reproductive capacity or death to the women involved;
(ii) burden interstate commerce by forcing women to
travel from States in which legal barriers render contracep-
tion or abortion unavailable or unsafe to other States or for-
eign nations;
(iii) interfere with freedom of travel between and
among the various States;
(iv) burden the medical and economic resources of
States that continue to provide women with access to safe
and legal abortion; and
(v) interfere with the ability of medical professionals to
provide health services;
(B) obstruct access to and use of contraceptives and
other medical techniques that are part of interstate and inter-
national commerce;
(C) discriminate between women who are able to afford
interstate and international travel and women who are not, a
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disproportionate number of whom belong to racial or ethnic
minorities; and
(D) infringe upon women's ability to exercise full enjoy-
ment of rights secured to them by Federal and State law,
both statutory and constitutional.
(3) Although Congress may not by legislation create consti-
tutional rights, it may, where authorized by its enumerated pow-
ers and not prohibited by a constitutional provision, enact
legislation to create and secure statutory rights in areas of legiti-
mate national concern.
(4) Congress has the affirmative power both under section 8
of Article I of the Constitution of the United States and under
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution to
enact legislation to prohibit State interference with interstate
commerce, liberty or equal protection of the laws.
(b) PURPOSE. - It is the purpose of this Act to establish, as a
statutory matter, limitations upon the power of States to restrict the
freedom of a woman to terminate a pregnancy in order to achieve the
same limitations as provided, as a constitutional matter, under the
strict scrutiny standard of review enunciated in Roe v. Wade and ap-
plied in subsequent cases from 1973 to 1988.
SEcrION 3. FREEDOM TO CHOOSE.
(a) IN GENERAL. - A State -
(1) may not restrict the freedom of a woman to choose
whether or not to terminate a pregnancy before fetal viability;
(2) may restrict the freedom of a woman to choose whether
or not to terminate a pregnancy after fetal viability unless such a
termination is necessary to preserve the life or health of the wo-
man; and
(3) may impose requirements on the performance of abor-
tion procedures if such requirements are medically necessary to
protect the health of women undergoing such procedures.
(b) RULES OF CONSTRUCTION. - Nothing in this Act shall
be construed to -
(1) prevent a State from protecting unwilling individuals or
private health care institutions from having to participate in the
performance of abortions to which they are conscientiously
opposed;
(2) prevent a State from declining to pay for the perform-
ance of abortions; or
(3) prevent a State from requiring a minor to involve a par-
ent, guardian, or other responsible adult before terminating a
pregnancy.
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SECTION 4. DEFINITION OF STATE.
As used in this Act, the term "State" includes the District of Co-
lumbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and each other territory
or possession of the United States.

